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CASENOTES

Central Bank: The End of Secondary
Liability Under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,1
petitioner served as an indentured trustee for bonds issued in 1986 and
1988 to finance public improvements at a planned residential and
commercial development.' Landowner assessment lien's secured the
bonds, and the covenant required the land subject to the lien be worth
at least 160 percent of the bond's outstanding principal and interest.'
The land's developer was to provide petitioner an annual report
indicating fulfillment of the 160 percent test.4 In January 1988, the
developer reported to petitioner that land values remained unchanged
from the 1986 appraisal." Shortly thereafter, the senior underwriter for

1. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993).
2. 114 S. Ct. at 1443. The securities involved totaled $11 million in bonds issued in
June 1988 by the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority. First
Interstate Bank of Denver v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 893 (10th Cir. 1992). The Authority had
also issued $15 million in bonds in 1986. Id. at 893.
3. 114 S. Ct. at 1443.
4. Id.
5. Id. The 1988 appraisal was performed by the same person who performed the
original appraisal of the land securing the 1986 bonds. First Interstate Bank of Denver
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the 1986 bonds sent a letter to petitioner asserting that property values
were declining and that petitioner was functioning on an appraisal
outdated by sixteen months.s In-house appraisers advised petitioner
that an independent review was needed on the 1988 appraisal.' At the
urging of the developer, petitioner agreed to delay the reappraisal until
six months after the closing of the 1988 bond issue.8 The Authority
defaulted on the 1988 bonds prior to the completion of the reappraisal.9
Respondent, as purchasers of $2.1 million of the 1988 bonds, sued
petitioner, among others, for violation of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.1" The complaint alleged petitioner was "secondarily liable under § 10(b) for its conduct in aiding and abetting the

v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 894 (10th Cir. 1992).
6. 114 S. Ct. at 1443. The in-house appraiser indicated that the Authority may have
given "false or misleading certifications.' First Interstate Bank of Denver v. Pring, 969
F.2d 891, 894 (10th Cir. 1992).
7. 114 S. Ct. at 1443. In a letter to the Authority, Central Bank indicated why an
independent review was necessary. First Interstate Bank ofDenver v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891,
894-95 (10th Cir. 1992). The reasons given were "(1) the comparable sales date was
outdated; (2) the methodology did not consider a bulk sale in forced liquidation context; and
(3) considering the local real estate market the values appeared 'unjustifiably optimistic'."
Id. at 895.
8. 114 S. Ct. at 1443.
9. Id.
10. Id. Respondent relied on the language of §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any securities
registered on a national securities exchange or any security nor so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1932 & Supp. II 1934).
Respondent also relied on the language of Rule 10b-5 which was adopted by the Securities
Exchange Commission in 1942 which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
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fraud."" The district court granted summary judgment to petitioner,
and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded.1" On appeal, the Supreme Court held that section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not permit a private plaintiff to
extend civil liability to those who only aid and abet the violation without
themselves engaging in manipulative or deceptive practices."
Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the aftermath
of the roaring 1920s and the 1929 stockmarket crash where fortunes
were accumulated and lost at astounding levels. 4 Much of the gain
during this period was attributable to fraud, manipulation, and other
highly questionable practices."5 T curb such practices, Congress
passed vital legislation-the Securities Act of 19336 ("1933 Act") and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). 7 The 1933 Act's
intent was to regulate initial distributions of securities, and the purpose
of the 1934 Act, ostensively, was to regulate post-distribution trading. 8
The 1934 Act did not expressly provide a private section 10(b) cause of
action; a section 10b-5 private liability scheme has been inferred through
several important Supreme Court decisions." In 1966, in Brennan v.
Midwestern Life Insurance Co." a 'federal court first adopted the
concept of imposing section 10(b) liability on aiders and abettors. 2' In

11. 114 S.Ct. at 1443.
12. First Interstate Bank of Denver v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1992). In their
decision, the court of appeals stated the elements of § 10(b) aiding and abetting cause of
action in the tenth circuit: (1) a primary violation of section 10(b); (2) recklessness by the
aider and abettor as to the existence of the primary violation; (3) substantial assistance
given to the primary violator by the aider and abettor. Id. at 898-903.
13. 114 S. Ct. at 1455. There were two questions presented to the Court on grant of
certiorari: (1) "Whether there is an implied private right of action for aiding and abetting
violations ofsection 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5." (2)
"Does recklessness satisfy the scienter requirement for aiding and abetting even where
there is no breach of a duty to disclose or to act?" Respondents Brief at 1, Central Bank
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (No. 92-854).
14. 114 S. Ct. at 1445.
15. Id.
16. 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1933).
17. 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934).
18. 114 S.Ct. at 1445. See Blue Chip Stamp v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752
(1975).
19. 114 S.Ct.at 1446. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113
S. Ct. 2085, 2090 (1993).
20. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
21. 259 F. Supp. at 681. Since the Brennan decision several courts have adopted §10(b)
aiding and abetting liability. 114 S.Ct. at 1444. See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc. 700
F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir.
1974).

1518

MERCER LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 46

Brennan, the principal violator of section 10(b) expended the stock
purchase money and failed to deliver defendant corporation's stock
valued at $2.9 million before going bankrupt.'
Plaintiff alleged
defendant was aware of the violation, and defendant's failure to report
aided and abetted the principal violator. As a result of the omission,
defendant "knowingly and purposely encouraged an artificial build-up in
the market for its stock.' The court stated "[a] basic philosophy of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is disclosure and is directed toward the
creation and maintenance of a post-issuance securities market that is
free from fraudulent practices."' The court's rationale was the Act,
being remedial in nature, should be expanded to include aiding and
abetting liability because it is "within the scope of the evils intended to
be eliminated."'
In the mid-1970's the Supreme Court began to
confront section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5's expanding liability.s In
challenging this expansion, the Court considered two main issues: the
scope of conduct prohibited by section 10(b) and the elements of the 10b5 private liability scheme once a defendant has committed a violation."
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,2s the Court attempted to define the
scope of conduct under section 10(b) for which defendants could be held
liable.'s Respondents were customers of a brokerage firm for which

22. 259 F. Supp. at 675.
23. Id. The complaint alleged the build-up placed defendant in a superior negotiating
position for a merger, and officers of the corporation realized great personal profits from
the sale of the stock. Id.
24. Id. at 680.
25. Id. The court went on to state "[inthe absence of a clear legislative expression to
the contrary, the statute must be flexibly applied so as to implement its policies and
purposes." Id. at 680-81.
26. 114 S. Ct. at 1445.
27. Id. The Court determined the scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b) in several
important decisions. Id. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446
U.S. 680 (1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). There was
no legislative guidance as to the elements of 10b-5 private liability when the defendant has
committed a violation. 114 S.Ct. at 1445. The Court has decided questions such as:
whether there is a right to contribution, what the statute of limitations is, whether there
is a reliance requirement, and whether there is an in part delicto defense. Id at 1445-46.
See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S.Ct. 2085 (1993); Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertseon, 501 U.S. 350 (1991); Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299
(1985).
28. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
29. 114 S.Ct. at 1446. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held on remand
"one who breaches a duty of inquiry and disclosure owed another is liable for damages for
aiding and abetting a third party's violation of Rule 10b-5 if the fraud would have been
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petitioner's accounting firm audited the books and records."° Respondents filed suit against petitioner for failing to discover the president of
the brokerage had committed securities fraud. The complaint, based on
a theory of negligent nonfeasance, alleged petitioner had aided and
abetted in violation of section 10(b) and Commission Rule 10b-5 by
failing to conduct proper audits.31 The Court initially looked to the text
of section 10(b) and stated "the words 'manipulative or deceptive' used
in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that s 10(b)
was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct."32 The
Commission in an amicus brief asserted "since the 'effect' upon investors
of given conduct is the same regardless of whether the conduct is
negligent or intentional, Congress intended to bar all such practices and
not just those done knowingly or intentionally.' The word "manipulative" was significant to the Court's reasoning because "it is ... virtually
a term of art when used in connection with securities markets" and
denotes intentional conduct.' The Court further noted the Commissioner and respondents' arguments were not supported by the legislative
history or structure of the Act. This holding, that a violation required
proof of more than negligence, was a significant development in section
10(b) liability.36 In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. u. Green,3 7 the Court
again narrowed the scope of section 10(b).' In Santa Fe, the issue was
whether majority stockholders' breach of fiduciary duty to minority

discovered or prevented but for the breach." 503 F.2d 1110 (1974).

30. 425 U.S. at 188.
31. Id. at 190. The premise of the complaint was petitioner did not utilize "appropriate

auditing procedures" and failed to discover Nay's rule that "only he could open mail
addressed to him... even if it arrived in his absence.' Id. Respondent asserted that if

petitioner had carried on a proper audit, the mail rule would have been discovered and
disclosed to the SEC. Id. This disclosure would have led to an investigation and the
fraudulent scheme would have been uncovered. Id.
32. Id. at 197.
33. Id. at 198.
34. Id. at 199.
35. Id. at 201, 208. The Court in examining the legislative history looked to the brief
explanation by a spokesman for the drafters which described § 10(b) as a "'catchall'" clause
to "'deal with new manipulative (or cunning) devices.'" Id. at 203. The Court went on to
state "[ilt is difficult to believe that any lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would

use these words if the intent was to create liability for merely negligent acts or omissions."
Id As to the structure of the Act, the Court stated "[iun each instance that Congress
created express civil liability in favor of purchasers or sellers of securities it clearly

specified whether recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional conduct,
negligence, or entirely innocent mistake." Id. at 207.
36. Id. at 215.
37. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
38. 114 S. Ct. at 1446.
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stockholders violated section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 without a charge of lack
of disclosure or misrepresentation." Petitioner controlled ninety-five
percent of the stock in a subsidiary and desired complete ownership.'
Under Delaware Corporation Law,4 ' the "short-form merger" statute,
petitioner was permitted, as the parent corporation owning at least
ninety percent of the stock in the subsidiary, to merge with the
subsidiary 42 The statute required approval of the merger by the
parent's board of directors and cash payments for the minority stockholder's shares.'
Neither consent nor advance notice to the minority
stockholders was required, but the minority stockholders had to be given
notice of the merger within ten days after its effective date. The statute
also provided a dissatisfied stockholder the opportunity to petition the
trial court for a decree ordering the surviving corporation to pay the
share's fair market value as determined by a court appointed appraiser." Respondent was dissatisfied with the offer of $150 per share,
asserting the fair market value was at least $772 per share. This figure
was based on the physical assets of the corporation shown in the
statement sent to the minority shareholders by the appraiser.' s
Respondent bypassed the Court of Chancery, filing a complaint in
district court alleging a Rule 10b-5 violation." According to the
Supreme Court, a claim of fraud and fiduciary breach violates Rule 10b5 "only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as 'manipulative or
deceptive' within the meaning of the statute."4 7 The conduct was
characterized as "corporate mismanagement", and the Court found that
Congress would not have used the words manipulative or deceptive in

39. 430 U.S. at 470. In reversing the district court, the court of appeals held "without
any misrepresentation or failure to disclose relevant facts, the merger itself constitutes a
violation of Rule 10b-5" because it was accomplished without any corporate purpose and
without prior notice to the minority stockholders. 533 F.2d 1283, 1285 (1976). The court
went on to reason "neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure was a necessary element
of a Rule lob-5 action." Id. at 1287.
40. 430 U.S. at 465.
41. 8 DEL. CODE § 253 (1975 ed. & Supp. 1976).
42. 430 U.S. at 465.
43. Id. at 465.
44. Id. at 465-66.
45. Id. at 467.
46. Id. Respondents' complaint alleged Santa Fe knew the value of the physical assets,
obtained a fraudulent appraisal, and offered $25 above the appraisal to seem generous.
Id. at 467. Respondents asserted that this conduct was in violation of Rule 10b-5 "because
defendants employed a 'device, scheme, or artifice to defraud' and engaged in an 'act,
practice or course of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale or any security.'" Id. at 467-68.
47. Id. at 473-74.
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section 10(b) to include the petitioner's acts. 48
Thus, in further
defining the scope of conduct prohibited under section 10(b), the Court
held that a breach of fiduciary duty by a majority stockholder does not
violate section 10(b) without deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure. 49 A third prominent case in which the Court narrowed the
coverage of section 10(b) was Chiarellav. United States."o The issue in
Chiarella was whether section 10(b) is violated when a person trades
securities without disclosing nonpublic information.51 Petitioner was
a financial printer hired to print corporate takeover bids.52 Having
deciphered the names of the target companies, petitioner purchased
stock in those companies, selling them after the takeover bids were
public." Petitioner was convicted of violating section 10(b) for not
disclosing the information obtained as a result of his position. The
question on appeal became whether petitioner had a duty to disclose his
information or refrain from trading the securities."' The Court looked
to Cady, Roberts & Co.,"' where the Commission decided that corporate
insiders could not trade shares in their own corporation unless disclosing
all material inside information known." The Court's reasoning was
"one who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do
so." 7 In order for a duty to arise, there must be some special relationship between the two parties.' As a low level employee of another
entity, petitioner was not a corporate insider and received no confidential information from the target company.' 9 In reversing the conviction,
the Court held section 10(b) was not violated by petitioner's silence

48. Id. at 477.
49. Id. at 474.
50. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
51. 144 S. Ct. at 1446.
52. 445 U.S. at 224.
53. Id. Petitioner, in the course of 14 months, had a return of over $30,000. Id.
Understandably, the SEC investigated, and petitioner entered into a consent decree
agreeing to return his profits to the seller. Id. Petitioner also lost his employment and
was convicted on 17 counts of violati-ig § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
54. Id. at 226.
55. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
56. 445 U.S. at 226-27.
57. Id. at 228. In affirming petitioner's conviction, the court of appeals held "[alnyone
corporate insider or not who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use
that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."
588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (1978).
58. 445 U.S. at 233.
59. Id. at 231.
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because there was no duty to disclose.' Clearly, based on these earlier
decisions, the Court was poised to take on the issue of section 10(b)
aiding and abetting liability, further limiting the scope of this "catchall"
section.
In the instant case, the Court granted certiorari to resolve confusion
over the scope of section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability."1 The
Court embarked on the interpretation of section 10(b) by prominently
noting the text of the statute would control the decision. 2 Respondent
argued that even though not expressly mentioned, the phrase "'directly
or indirectly'" in the text of section 10(b) covered aiding and abetting
liability.' The Court addressed this contention reasoning that aiding
and abetting liability reaches past "persons who engage, even indirectly,
in a proscribed activity", to those who provide any degree of assistance
or aid to individuals directly or indirectly engaging in the activity."
The Court also cited several provisions of the 1934 Act using the phrase
"directly or indirectly" in ways other than imposing aiding and abetting
liability.' In concluding the text of the 1934 Act did not expressly
provide liability for aiding and abetting, the Court stated "Congress
knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so",
and would have used the words "'aid'" and "'abet'" in the text.6
Though having actually disposed of the case, the Court continued the
analysis by attempting to infer how the 1934 Congress would have dealt
67
with the issue had the 10b-5 action been included in the 1934 Act.
The Court used the express causes of action in the securities Acts as a
model because "[hiad the 73d Congress enacted a private § 10(b) right
of action, it likely would have designed it in a manner similar to the
other private rights of action in the securities Acts.' After surveying
several 1934 Act sections, the Court concluded that because no private
aiding and abetting liability was included in any of the express causes

60. Id.
61. 114 S. Ct. at 1444.
62. Id. at 1446.
63. Id. at 1447.
64. Id.
65. Id. See § 7(f)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f)(2XC) (direct or indirect ownership of stock);
§ 9(bX2)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b)(2)(3) (direct or indirect interest in put, call, straddle, option,
or privilege); § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (direct or indirect ownership); § 16(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78p(a) (direct or indirect ownership); § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (direct or indirect
ownership); § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (direct or indirect control of person violating Act). 114
S. Ct. at 1448.
66. 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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of action, it could be inferred Congress "likely would not have attached
aiding and abetting liability to § 10(b) had it provided a private § 10(b)
cause of action.' According to the Court, this reasoning was supported by the absence of reliance, a crucial element under section 10(b) for
recovery.70 The Court cited the holding in Basic Inc. v. Levinson7
that "[a] plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant's misstatement
or omission to recover under 10b-5." 2 To allow aiding and abetting
liability to disregard the element of reliance would override the
foundations of section 10(b) laid down in earlier judicial decisions.'
Respondent then invoked the "broadbased notion of congressional intent"
by asserting Congress passes legislation with a general comprehension
of tort law, and aiding and abetting liability was "'Well established in
both civil and criminal actions by 1934."' In response, the Court
stated when suing under a federal statute "there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors. 7 5 In support
of this reasoning, the Court cited several examples of Congress' "statuteby-statute" approach to civil liability.' The Court also cited several
provisions of the securities laws, enforceable only by the SEC, which
prohibit aiding and abetting.7 7 These provisions support the Court's

69. Id. at 1449. The Court looked to the 1933 Act, § 11 which "prohibits false
statements or omissions of material fact in registration statement; it identifies the various
categories of defendants subject to liability for a violation, but that list does not include
aiders and abettors." Id. The Court also examined § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (prohibits the sale
of unregistered securities); § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (prohibits wash sales, match orders); § 16,
15 U.S.C. § 78p (prohibits short-swing trading by owners, directors, and officers); § 18, 15
U.S.C. § 78r (prohibits any person from making misleading statements in reports filed with
the SEC); § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (prohibits any person from engaging in insider trading).
114 S. Ct. at 1449.
70. Id.
71. 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
72. 114 S. Ct. at 1449.
73. Id. at 1450.
74. Id. (quoting Brief for the SEC at 10, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (No. 92-854)).
75. 114 S. Ct. at 1450-51. See, e.g., Electronic Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen 977 F.2d 798,
805-06 (3rd Cir. 1992).
76. 114 S. Ct. at 1451. The Court cited as examples: 26 U.S.C. § 6701 (1988 ed., Supp.
IV) (Internal Revenue Code); 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (The Commodity Exchange Act); 12 U.S.C.
§ 504(h) (1988 ed., Supp. IV) (Federal Reserve Act).
77. 114 S. Ct. at 1451. The provisions cited were: 15 U.S.C. § 78o(bX4)(E) (1988 ed. &
Supp. MV)
(SEC may proceed against brokers and dealers who aid and abet a violation of
the securities laws); Insider Trader Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat.
1264 (civil penalty provision added in 1984 applicable to those who aid and abet insider
trading violations); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (1988 ed., Supp. IV) (civil penalty provision added in
1990 applicable to brokers and dealers who aid and abet various violations of the Act).
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reasoning that Congress deliberately chose to impose aiding and abetting
liability in specific statutes and in others decided against secondary
liability.' The Court rejected both parties' arguments as to subsequent
legislative support and acquiescence finding "[als a general matter ...
these arguments deserve little weight in the interpretative process."79
The Commission's brief asserted various policy arguments to support
aiding and abetting liability," In assessing these arguments the Court
noted policy arguments do not prevail over the interpretation of the text
"except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence to the
text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could
not have intended it.""' The Court found the rules of aiding and
abetting liability to be unclear, and their lack of clarity might lead to
unwanted results.82 At oral argument the Commission advanced an
unusual argument asserting that 18 U.S.C. § 2, the criminal aiding and
abetting liability statute, was "'significant'" in this case.' The Court
refused to rely on the statute because it would allow for civil aiding and
abetting in every provision of the Act.8 In the end, the Court found no
private aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) unless the
secondary actor commits a deceptive or manipulative act.' Having
conceded petitioner's acts were neither manipulative nor deceptive,
respondent could not hold petitioner liable as an aider and abettor."'
Clearly, the Court's holding in Central Bank greatly furthers the
judicial trend to cut back on the scope of section 10(b)'s coverage. The
Court's decisive statement for legislative action in this area is based on
an established policy of rejecting implied causes of action. 7 Yet,
secondary liability under section 10(b) is well settled law in judicial and

78. 114 S. Ct. at 1452.
79. Id. at 1453.
80. Id. See Brief for the SEC at 16-17, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (No. 92-854). SEC asserted "the aiding and abetting
cause of action, deters secondary actors and ensures that defrauded plaintiffs are made
whole." 114 S. Ct. at 1453.
81. 114 S. Ct. at 1453-54.
82. Id. at 1454. The Court stated large sums would be spent to defend claims and
settlements would be paid to avoid the expense of litigation. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Tr. of Oral Argument at 41, 43, Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (No. 92-854)).
84. Id. at 1455.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87.

Harold S. Bloomenthal, Supreme Court:Aiding andAbetting Does Not Violate Rule

10b.5, Vol. 16, No. 5 SECURMIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE L. REP. 121, 122 (1994). See
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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As a result, Congress could show
administrative proceedings. '
approval of the old law through an amendment to the Act.8" Curiously,
the decision raises more questions than answers. First, what effect will
the ruling have on the Commission's right to pursue aiders and abettors
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5? The majority stated that it was
dispositive that the language of section 10(b) did not reach aiders and
abettors. ' In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated "Itihe majority leaves
little doubt that the Exchange Act does not even permit the Commission
to pursue aiders and abettors in civil enforcement actions under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5." Commission reports indicate "that it asserted aiding
and abetting claims in fifteen percent of its civil enforcement proceedings
in fiscal year 1992 ... ."' Clearly, if the dissent is correct the ruling
will greatly reduce the type of actions available to the Commission."
Secondly, what part must a secondary actor in a section 10(b) violation
play in order to be held liable as a primary violator? 4 In dictum, the
Court noted "Itihe absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does
not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free
In the securities field there are numerous
from liability .....
secondary actors providing advice or services to those who engage in the
buying and selling of securities. The conduct of these secondary actors
must now meet the requirements for primary liability." Yet, do these
individuals have a duty to disclose under the Chiarellaruling? Other
than in fraud or insider information cases, the secondary actors could
possibly avoid liability, even if their acts could be characterized as
manipulative or deceptive. Finally, what effect will the lack of

88. 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1456 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1459.
90. 114 S.Ct. 1439, 1448.
91. 114 S.Ct. 1439, 1460 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1460 n.11. See Brief for the SEC at 18 n.15, Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (No. 92-854).
93. Id. See Brief for the SEC at 18, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (No. 92-854).
94. Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Implications of CentralBank-PartTwo, Vol. 16, No.
7 SECURITIES & FEDERAL CoRPoRATE L. REP. 137, 141 (1994).
95. 114 S.Ct. at 1455.
96. Id.
97. See Bloomenthal, supra note 94, at 141. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1994). The Court stated "the duty to disclose arises when one party has information
'that the other [party) is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation
of trust and confidence between them.'" Id. at 228. Rule 14(e)-3, enacted after Chiarella,
applies to tender offers and makes it a violation of § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 for any person "who is in possession of material information relating to such tender
offer" to trade in the securities prior to the public disclosure of the tender offer.
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secondary liability have on victims of a section 10(b) violation? Absent
secondary liability, the Court implied victims will still receive compensation for their loss due to the multiple defendants often associated with
section 10(b) violations.s Yet, prior judicial decisions broadening the
scope of section 10(b) were premised in part upon the Act's remedial
nature. This liberal construction almost insured full compensation for
wronged plaintiffs. The Court's strict statutory construction could leave
many plaintiffs without adequate compensation by forcing them to prove
deception or manipulation on the part of aiders and abettors."
Although Central Bank decisively narrows section 10(b) aiding and
abetting liability, many of the unresolved and peripheral issues
surrounding the Court's decision may well surface in the near future.
STEPHEN H. BROWN

98. 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
99. 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1457 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized that
"shortly before the Exchange Act was passed, this Court instructed that such 'remedial'
legislation should receive 'a broader and more liberal interpretation than that to be drawn
from mere dictionary definitions of the words employed by Congress.'" Id. (quoting
Piedmont & Northern R. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311 (1932)). The dissent went on to add
[there is a risk of anachronistic error in applying our current approach to implied causes
of action,. . . to a statute enacted when courts commonly read statutes of this kind broadly
to accord with their remedial purposes ....
" Id.

